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Abstract 
This chapter presents some insights from basic behavioural research on the role of human 
pro-social motivation to maintain social order. I argue that social order can be conceptualised 
as a public good game. Past attempts to explain social order typically relied on the 
assumption of selfish and rational agents ("homo economicus"). The last twenty years of 
research in behavioural and experimental economics have challenged this view. After 
presenting the most important findings of recent research on human pro-sociality I discuss the 
evidence on three pillars of the maintenance of social order. The first pillar is internalised 
norms of cooperation, sustained by emotions such as guilt and shame. The second pillar is the 
behaviour of other people who typically are "conditional cooperators" willing to cooperate if 
others do so as well. This motivation can sustain cooperation if enough people cooperate but 
can jeopardise social order if many others follow selfish inclinations. The third pillar are 
sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a 
mere threat without being executed much. The chapter also presents some evidence on the 
cross-cultural variability of some findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. 
The chapter concludes with remarks on future research.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic approaches to understanding human behavior, including law abidance, have long 
assumed that people are self-regarding in the sense that they entertain cost-benefit 
calculations with the sole concern being own costs and benefits, irrespective of consequences 
for others. The last twenty years of research in behavioral economics have profoundly 
challenged this assumption (Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr 2005) with important 
consequences for our understanding of lawful behavior and social order in general. The 
question I will discuss in this chapter is how pro-social motivations help understand social 
order.  
I will discuss evidence from the last two decades of behavioral economics research that 
sheds light on human pro-social motivations. I will focus my attention on people’s behavior 
in social settings where the welfare of other people is affected. Of course, there are important 
behavioral aspects of law abidance from an asocial, individual decision-making perspective. 
These concern the roles of probability perception (e.g., the perceived probability of being 
caught for a criminal act) and heuristics and biases in general (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). 
I do not deal with these issues here but refer the interested reader to Sunstein (2000), and to 
the chapter on heuristics and biases by Baron in this volume. My focus is on pro-social 
motivation, not cognition.  
The basic conceptual framework I will use to study social order is going back to at least 
Hobbes and consists in thinking of social order as a cooperation problem: If the law is widely 
disregarded we end up in a world were life is “nasty, brutish, and short”. Contributing to 
social order (obeying the law) is of collective interest but individuals have an incentive to 
disregard the law if this promises to be more advantageous than abiding by the law. Of 
course, the law also has an important coordinating function which makes obeying the law 
also in people's self-interest - think of traffic laws, for instance. In this chapter, however, I 
will not discuss coordination problems, but focus on cooperation. 
One may argue that modern societies rest on constitutions and legal enforcement 
mechanisms with checks and balances that sharply limit individual decisions to flout the law. 
However, as examples from failed states vividly demonstrate, legal enforcement cannot work 
if large groups in society disregard the law because they think respecting the law is not to 
their advantage. Thus, a functioning law enforcement system is itself an example of 
successful cooperation.  3 
 
The problem of cooperation can most easily be understood in the following simple 
example. Suppose two farmers reach an agreement to respect each other’s property but there 
is no third party to enforce this agreement. Now the two farmers have to think whether to 
stick to their promise or not. Suppose they both abide by their agreement and therefore have 
an incentive to cultivate their land which gives them a comfortable living. But one farmer 
might be tempted to renege on his promise and steal the harvest of the other farmer who 
trusted that he would be safe and therefore invested in a good crop. The stealing farmer 
enjoys a harvest for which he did not work, and the victim is robbed of his proceeds. If 
farmers are not gullible (or learn from experience) they might anticipate this outcome and not 
invest much in cultivating the land which leaves both in a miserable situation but still better 
than losing all harvest after a season of hard work. This, of course, is the famous prisoners’ 
dilemma: mutually sticking to the agreement is in the common interest but not in each 
individual’s interest.  
The prisoners’ dilemma as a metaphor for cooperation has been the focus of decades of 
research (Rapoport and Chammah 1965; Axelrod 1984; Van Lange, Balliet, Parks, and Van 
Vugt 2014). One important insight has been that cooperation (i.e., honoring the agreement) 
might be maintained in my example if these farmers are likely to play the game in the 
foreseeable future with the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod 1984) looming strongly enough. 
The mutual threat to renege on the agreement if the other farmer reneges might be strong 
enough to honor the agreement. If successful, we have an example of self-enforcement. Such 
self-enforcement is much harder to achieve if the players are not settled farmers but mobile 
bands of hunter-gatherers because under the latter conditions there is no common shadow of 
the future but only a short-term cooperation problem, which favors defection.  
Modern social life differs of course from this simple example: cooperation problems 
need to be solved for large groups, where decisions take place both in stable settings and 
random interactions. But large groups, even if they are stable, are fundamentally different 
from two-person prisoner's dilemmas: theory suggests (Boyd and Richerson 1988) and 
experimental evidence confirms (Grujić et al. 2012) that stable cooperation is possible in the 
two-person prisoner's dilemma but is hard to achieve in large groups because no effective 
punishment targeted at non-compliant group members exists. Thus, for understanding large-
scale cooperation the prisoner's dilemma is not fully suitable and recent research has 
therefore shifted to the public goods game as a tool to study multi-lateral cooperation. This 
game will be the major tool I will use in this chapter.  4 
 
One important insight of many experiments using the public goods game is that 
cooperation is inherently unstable and tends to unravel to the worst outcome, predicted by 
self-interest. Doesn't this prove that people are selfish in the end? My answer will be a 
qualified No. Some people are indeed likely to be selfish. Many people, however, will behave 
selfishly under some conditions, but are not motivated by selfishness. As I will show, the 
distinction between motivation and behavior is important and ought not to be conflated. 
People can be non-selfishly motivated and end up behaving selfishly, but the converse also 
exists: selfish people behaving pro-socially.  
The main tool to investigate my questions has been economic experiments, with 
decision-dependent monetary stakes.  A full description of the experimental methodology is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. The interested reader should consult Falk and Heckman 
(2009) and Engel (in this volume). 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 will lay the foundation of my analysis of 
determinants of social order by offering an overview of the most important findings 
suggesting that the homo economicus assumption used for decades in economics and other 
behavioral sciences is not justified. Many people are more aptly described as homo 
reciprocans, i.e., non-selfish “strong reciprocators” (Gintis 2000) and I will present the most 
important evidence supporting the existence of strong reciprocators. A strong reciprocator is 
prepared to sacrifice resources to be kind to those who are being kind ("strong positive 
reciprocity") and to punish those who are being unkind ("strong negative reciprocity"). The 
essential feature of strong reciprocity is a willingness to reward fair and punish unfair 
behavior even if this is costly and provides neither present nor future material rewards for the 
reciprocator (Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter 2002). However, as I will show, all experiments 
that find evidence for strong reciprocity also find the existence of mostly self-regarding 
people.  
The rest of this chapter will then discuss how homo economicus and homo reciprocans 
deal with social order. I will argue that social order is sustained, to some extent, by 
internalized norms of proper conduct even in the absence of any formal enforcement. Social 
order is also, and very strongly so, influenced by the behavior of other people because homo 
reciprocans is more likely to contribute to the common good if others do the same. I will also 
show that punishment or other incentives are necessary to sustain social order.  5 
 
A first pillar of social order, and probably the weakest one, is personal ethics, or 
internalized norms of cooperation, enforced by feelings of guilt: Cooperation can be 
supported to the extent that people think cooperating is the morally right thing to do and feel 
guilty if breaking the social contract. Section 3 investigates the role of internalized norms of 
proper conduct to sustain cooperation. In Section 4 I will show that social order is bound to 
be fragile if not backed up by incentives. This holds despite the fact that most people are not 
fundamentally self-regarding and, as Section 3 will show, express moral apprehension at free 
riding. An important insight is that some people are selfish and that homo reciprocans, while 
not being selfish, sometimes tends to be selfishly biased. Section 5 discusses evidence that 
(the threat of) punishment is crucial to maintain social order. Homo reciprocans has a 
decisive role to play because homo reciprocans is prepared to pay a cost to punish those who 
jeopardize social order. Rewards and a desire for a good reputation can also help.  
Section 6 will present some cross-societal evidence and show that punishment is also 
shaped by how well the Rule of Law works in a given society. Section 7 will present a short 
discussion and outlook for future research.  
Before I proceed I should clarify what this chapter does and does not provide. Research 
in the behavioral sciences searches for basic behavioral principles that underlie all social 
dilemmas however diverse they are in reality. My approach therefore is not applied science 
(although I will point to some interesting applied findings) but basic science that should 
provide general behavioral principles that can inform more applied research.  The behavioral 
research I report here is complementary to approaches studying the role of social norms in 
law and its enforcement (e.g., Ellickson 1991; Posner 2000; Kahan 2003).  
 
2.  BASIC SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS:  
HOMO ECONOMICUS AND HOMO RECIPROCANS 
Homo economics has long been the most important characterization of human nature in the 
behavioral sciences and in particular in economics. David Hume famously remarked that 
“Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of 
government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought 
to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest” 
(Hume 1987 [1777], Essay VI, p. 42).  George Stigler, a Nobel laureate in Economic 6 
 
Sciences, was convinced: “Let me predict the outcome of the systematic and comprehensive 
testing of behavior in situations where self-interest and ethical values with wide verbal 
allegiance are in conflict. Much of the time, most of the time in fact, the self-interest theory 
… will win" (Stigler 1981, p. 175). 
There are several justifications for the selfishness assumption. Homo economicus is 
neutral to other people, that is, he is neither envious or malicious and also not altruistic. Thus, 
he might be considered the average person on whom social analysis should be based 
(Kirchgässner 2008). Furthermore, in a theoretical context, the homo economicus assumption 
often allows for exact predictions, which can be confronted with appropriate data that might 
refute it. Moreover, it is often of independent interest to understand what would happen if 
everyone were self-regarding. A clear picture of the consequences of selfishness serves 
therefore as an important benchmark for understanding non-selfish behavior.  
The assumption of self-regard also has considerable merit in the absence of empirical 
means to assess the structure of people’s social preferences.  Yet, the experimental 
methodology allows us to observe people’ social preferences under controlled circumstances. 
Advances in neuroscience (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, and Poldrack 2009), anthropology 
(Henrich et al. 2004), behavioral economics (Gintis et al. 2005), evolutionary theory (Bowles 
and Gintis 2011) and social psychology (Van Lange et al. 2014) shed further light on human 
nature. Thus, given the availability of appropriate tools to measure deviations from 
selfishness, there is no need to rely further on the selfishness assumption. Its empirical 
relevance can now be measured.  
In the following I will present evidence that supports the widespread existence of homo 
reciprocans. The classic games used to study people’s social preferences are the dictator 
game, the ultimatum game, the trust and the gift-exchange game, and the public goods game 
with and without punishment. All experiments I will discuss are conducted according to the 
standards of experimental economics (see Friedman and Sunder 1994 for a textbook account) 
and have been replicated many times, including in representative samples, under high stakes, 
and in relevant field conditions. Moreover, all experiments are designed to carefully control 
for self-regarding incentives, such that self-interest theory makes a unique prediction that can 
be compared with the behavioral outcome. If behavior differs from the self-interest prediction 
we have evidence for non-selfish behavior.  7 
 
The dictator game (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton 1994) is the most basic 
decision situation in which social preferences can be studied. The dictator game is a two-
player game where participants are assigned at random to be either a “dictator” or a passive 
recipient. The dictator has to decide how much of a given amount of money allocated to him 
or her to share with a recipient who has to accept the offer. The experimental setting ensures 
that a self-interested rational dictator has an incentive not to share. Passing money along to 
the recipient under these conditions is evidence for altruism, or other-regarding preferences in 
general.   
The results of many carefully controlled dictator games do not support self-interest 
predictions on average. In a meta-analysis Engel (2011) finds that across 616 treatments 
involving the dictator game, the average sharing rate is 28.3 percent and across all studies 
about 36 percent of individuals do not share at all. Thus, many people are willing to share a 
windfall gain, but (depending on the treatment) a sizeable minority is not.  
How about sharing principles if recipients can reject the offer? The seminal game to 
study this situation is the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982). In the 
ultimatum game the proposer makes an offer of how to share a given pie and, in contrast to 
the dictator game, the recipient can now accept or reject the offer. In case of acceptance, the 
offered division is implemented; in case the recipient rejects, both get nothing. If the recipient 
is motivated solely by monetary payoffs, he or she will accept every offer. Therefore, the 
proposer will only offer the smallest money unit.  
The results across a wide range of subject pools around the world reject this prediction 
(Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de Kuilen 2004). On average, proposers offer 30 to 40 percent of 
the available amount. The median and the mode are at 40 and 50 percent, respectively. Few 
offers are less than10 percent, or more than 50 percent. Offers below 20 percent or less will 
likely be rejected, while equal splits are almost always accepted.  
The offers made in the ultimatum game appear inconsistent with the homo economicus 
model of human nature. However, it is important to observe that all types of proposers, self- 
and other-regarding ones, have an incentive to offer non-minimal (fair) shares, if some 
recipients are inclined to reject low offers. Thus the mere fact that we observe high offers is 
not inconsistent with the homo economicus model. The inconsistency arises for the recipient 
who foregoes earnings by rejecting a positive offer – homo economicus would never do that. 
Cross-societal variation notwithstanding, when it comes to rejections, there is abundant 8 
 
support for the existence of strong negative reciprocity, and no support for the homo 
economicus prediction in almost any of the many societies studied (Oosterbeek et al. 2004; 
Henrich et al. 2005; Henrich et al. 2006).  
The next game, the gift-exchange game (developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl 
1993), showcases strong positive reciprocity where homo reciprocans  non-strategically 
rewards a kind act by being kind as well. A simple version of the gift-exchange game works 
as follows. There are two roles, employers and employees. In each round, an employer and 
employee are paired up at random. The employer makes a wage offer to his or her paired 
employee, who can accept or reject the offer. Acceptance concludes an employment contract. 
The employee then chooses effort and the round ends. "Effort" means choosing a number 
with the consequence that the higher the chosen number the higher is the employer’s profit 
and the higher are the employee’s effort cost. The earnings of employers increase in effort 
and decrease in wages paid. For the employee the opposite holds. Parameters are such that 
maximal effort maximizes surplus.  
The setup ensures that there are no strategic reasons for gift exchange. A homo 
economicus employee will choose the minimum effort irrespective of the wage because effort 
is costly. Homo reciprocans, however, will respond reciprocally: high wages are rewarded 
with high effort and low wages are matched with low effort.  
The results of numerous experiments support the homo reciprocans prediction over the 
homo economicus one, on average, because wage and effort are highly significantly 
correlated. This is unambiguous evidence for strong positive reciprocity, found in numerous 
gift-exchange experiments (see Charness and Kuhn 2011 for an overview). However, the 
results also reveal substantial heterogeneity. Irrespective of the wage paid by the firm there is 
always a fraction of workers who choose minimal effort – like in the dictator game homo 
economicus exists but is in the minority. 
A game related to the gift-exchange game that also allows for the observation of strong 
positive reciprocity is the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). The trust game is a 
two-player game where participants are anonymously and at random allocated to their roles 
as trustor and trustee. The trustor (and in some experiments also the trustee) has an 
endowment and has to decide how much of this endowment to transfer to the trustee. Any 
amount the trustor transfers the experimenter increases by a factor of 3 (in some studies by a 
factor of 2 or 4). The trustee then decides how much of the increased amount to transfer back 9 
 
to the trustor. Homo economicus in the role of recipient will not return anything irrespective 
of the amount received (and rational trustors would foresee this and transfer nothing). 
Numerous studies with student and wide-ranging non-student subject pools have been 
conducted with the trust game. Johnson and Mislin (2011) found in a meta-analysis of 162 
replications in 35 countries that trustors on average send 50 percent of their endowment and 
trustees return 37 percent of the amount available for return. Regression analyses show clear 
support for strong positive reciprocity: Trustees return highly significantly more the more 
they have received from the trustor.  
In sum, the gift-exchange game and the trust game provide substantial evidence for the 
existence of strong positive reciprocity. Rejections in the ultimatum game are an example of 
strong negative reciprocity. But these are all two-player games. I have argued in the 
introduction that to understand human cooperation one needs to move beyond dyadic 
interactions. The following game, the public good game, is a vehicle to study strong positive 
reciprocity in the context of a simultaneous multi-lateral game.  
In a typical linear public good game, four people form a group. All group members are 
endowed with 20 tokens.  Each member has to decide independently how many tokens 
(between 0 and 20) to contribute to a common project (the public good). The contributions of 
the whole group are summed up. The experimenter then multiplies the sum of contributions 
by a factor larger than one but less than four (a frequently used factor is 1.6) and distributes 
the resulting amount equally among the four group members irrespective of how much an 
individual has contributed. Thus, an individual benefits from the contributions of other group 
members, even if he or she has contributed nothing to the public good. A rational and self-
regarding individual has an incentive to keep all tokens, because the personal benefit per 
token from the public good is less than one, whereas it is 1 if he or she keeps the token. By 
contrast, the group as a whole is best off if everybody contributes all 20 tokens.  
A large number of studies show that people contribute to the public good (see Chaudhuri 
2011 for an overview), but, as I will describe in more detail in the next section, contributions 
decrease over time in experiments that allow for repetition of the base game. In this section I 
focus on one-shot games because my goal is to demonstrate the existence of strong positive 
reciprocity, and this requires controlling for any self-regarding incentives. One-shot games 
provide the starkest environment to study cooperation motivated by strong reciprocity 
because there are no strategic reasons to make any positive contribution. Thus, homo 10 
 
economicus will take a free ride in this game. Again, the results do not confirm this 
prediction. Many people make a positive contribution, although a significant fraction 
contributes nothing (e.g., Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt 2011).  
The fact that people make positive contributions does not yet constitute evidence for 
strong positive reciprocity. In a game where group members make their contribution 
decisions simultaneously people cannot respond to what they have observed others to do; 
people can only react to the beliefs they hold about other group members’ contributions. 
Thus, some experiments ask the participants what they estimate the other group members will 
contribute (e.g., Dufwenberg et al. 2011). The results are consistent with strong positive 
reciprocity: on average, reported beliefs and own contributions are highly significantly 
positively correlated. While this holds for a majority of people, some contribute nothing 
despite the fact they believe others will contribute a lot. Again, homo economicus and homo 
reciprocans co-exist.  
The final game I discuss is the public good game with punishment (Fehr and Gächter 
2000; Fehr and Gächter 2002). It provides another example for the existence of strong 
negative reciprocity. In this game, the group members first contribute to the public good. 
Then group members learn how much all have contributed and are given the opportunity to 
spend money to reduce the income of each of the other group members individually. One 
money unit spent on punishing a group member reduces this group member’s earnings from 
the first stage by three money units. Homo economicus will of course not spend any money to 
punish others, but homo reciprocans might be willing to punish the free riders in the group.  
The results show that many people are prepared to punish free riders. In fact, in the 
experiments of Fehr and Gächter (2002) more than 80 percent of people punished at least 
once. Fehr and Gächter repeated their experiment six times, but each time with entirely new 
group members and in a way that excluded any further interactions with any previous group 
members.  Punishment showed a reciprocal pattern in each of the six one-shot repetitions: 
more free riding was met with more punishment. Gächter and Herrmann (2009) and Cubitt, 
Drouvelis, and Gächter (2011a) found the same result in strict one-shot experiments. Such 
punishment has been called “altruistic” because it is individually costly and benefits others 
only; it is evidence of strong negative reciprocity. These experiments and a related large 
literature (surveyed in Gächter and Herrmann 2009; Balliet, Mulder, and Van Lange 2011; 11 
 
and Chaudhuri 2011) show that many people are strong negative reciprocators with punitive 
sentiments for wrongdoing.  
What are possible psychological (proximate) mechanisms that produce strong 
reciprocity? At the most fundamental level, it is the evolved human capacity of empathy 
which only psychopaths lack (Baron-Cohen 2011). Relevant for my specific question, 
research has identified three important mechanisms: inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000); efficiency seeking (Charness and Rabin 2002); and a 
desire to reward or punish intentions behind actions (also called reciprocity; Rabin 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004) or a combination of inequality aversion and rewarding 
and punishing intentions (Falk and Fischbacher 2006). A detailed description is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but I will provide the ideas. Thorough discussions can be found in the 
cited articles and in Fehr and Schmidt (2006); see Wilkinson and Klaes (2012) for a textbook 
account. Bowles and Gintis (2011) provide evolutionary (ultimate) explanations of strong 
reciprocity.  
Inequality aversion. Inequality aversion, in particular the version by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), is probably the most widely used theory to explain the reviewed behavior in 
experimental games. The theory assumes that people care about their own material payoff 
positively and negatively about inequality in comparison with another person both in case the 
inequality is advantageous (the focal individual has more than the comparison individual) and 
if it is disadvantageous (the focal individual has less than the comparison individual). It is 
assumed that disadvantageous inequality is worse than advantageous inequality.  
The theory of inequality aversion can explain why people reject unfair offers in 
ultimatum games (an example of strong negative reciprocity): while there is a positive utility 
from the material benefit of a (small) offer, there is also disutility from inequality. It is 
therefore possible that the disutility outweighs the utility from the offered amount, and 
therefore total utility is negative and the person rejects. A second example of how 
disadvantageous inequality aversion can explain strong negative reciprocity is punishment of 
free riders in a public good game: a free rider who does not contribute anything will earn 
more than all others who have contributed. This will leave the contributors behind in payoff 
comparisons and they will experience disadvantageous inequality aversion. A contributor 
who punishes a free rider may reduce the gap in earnings and therefore inequality by 
punishing. Aversion to advantageous inequality can also explain why people behave in a 12 
 
positive reciprocal way when making contributions to a public good. If a group member 
believes others will contribute he or she might feel advantageous inequality aversion if not 
contributing. To alleviate this feeling, she contributes. An inequality averse person will also 
not contribute more than others because this way she would fall behind in terms of payoffs.  
There are, however, a couple of important phenomena that the theory of inequality 
aversion does not address: many people are motivated by efficiency seeking and are therefore 
willing to help others even if that increases inequality (a strictly inequality averse person 
would not do that), and people care not only about outcomes as assumed in theories of 
inequality aversion, but also about the intentions behind actions. I will deal with these two 
problems in turn. 
Efficiency seeking. Inequality aversion implies that people will always take actions, if 
available, that reduce inequality. But experiments have shown that many people are also 
willing to help other people if that increases efficiency despite also increasing inequality 
(Charness and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004). Thus, a social concern for 
efficiency most likely is an important motivation for some, and it might also explain why 
people make contributions to public goods.  
Intentions matter. A second problem with the theory of inequality aversion is that it is 
purely outcome-oriented, i.e., the intentions behind other people’s actions do not matter. 
However, there are many cases where intentionality is important. For example, receiving an 
unfair offer (involving a disadvantageous unequal distribution) if a fair offer (an equal 
distribution) is available might not be perceived the same as if the only available other offer 
is also unfair (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003). Theories of reciprocity (e.g., Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger 2004) model intentions by assuming that people are motivated by rewarding 
kindness with kindness and meanness by meanness. Making a fair offer when an unfair offer 
is available (and better for the proposer) is an example of a kind act; offering an unfair 
distribution when a fair one would have been available is an example of unkind behavior. 
Another example is contributions to a public good: if a group member believes others will 
contribute a lot then he or she might perceive this as a kind act and reward the kindness by 
contributing as well; by the same token, a low expected contribution might be perceived as 
unkind and therefore be matched with a low contribution as well (Dufwenberg et al. 2011). 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) combine inequality aversion and intentions, and show that 13 
 
intentions might lead to more punishment of unfair offers and free riding than inequality 
aversion alone.  
In sum, strong positive and negative reciprocity are probably to a large extent motivated 
by psychological mechanisms of inequality aversion and a desire to base rewards and 
punishments on the intentions behind an action; in some important cases concerns for social 
efficiency also matter. Existing research clearly suggests an important role for these 
mechanisms (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2005). For my purposes, however, it suffices to 
work with strong positive and negative reciprocity as motivational shortcuts.  
In the following I will turn to the central question of this chapter, the determinants of 
social order. In the next three sections I will show how the basic inclinations of strong 
positive and negative reciprocity determine (the breakdown of) social order. 
 
3.  THE DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL ORDER I:  
INTERNALIZED NORMS 
One important determinant of people’s pro-social behavior is most likely internalized norms 
of what people consider the morally right thing to do. For example, people donate 
anonymously to charities (Eckel and Grossman 1996), they vote for reasons of civic duty, 
despite their vote being extremely unlikely pivotal (Riker and Ordeshook 1968); they respect 
the law (Cooter 2000) also if incentives that back up the obligations are weak (Galbiati and 
Vertova 2008). People pay their taxes despite low detection probabilities for evasion 
(Kirchler 2007), and people also care for the environment out of moral convictions (Brekke, 
Kipperberg, and Nyborg 2010). More generally, people value character virtues such as 
honesty and trustworthiness even if lying and cheating go entirely undetected (e.g., Gneezy 
2005; López-Pérez and Spiegelman 2013; see Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013 for an 
interesting field study) and also act on perceived moral obligations (Schwartz 1977). As 
shown above, in experiments people make contributions to one-shot public goods without 
any extrinsic incentive to do so. One early piece of evidence that is consistent with intrinsic 
motivations is that people contribute for reasons of "warm glow" (Andreoni 1990).  
In this section I discuss some evidence about normative considerations and related moral 
emotions in social dilemmas.  I discuss studies that investigate people’s moral judgments, the 14 
 
social emotions of anger and guilt, and people’s desire to punish norm violators even if not 
personally affected (“third-party punishment”).  
I start with moral judgments of free riding. Is free riding morally blameworthy at all? 
Cubitt, Drouvelis, Gächter, and Kabalin (2011b) report on a study that elicited people’s moral 
judgments of free riding by using techniques from moral psychology to understand to what 
extent free riding is perceived to be a moral problem. The basic design of Cubitt and his 
colleagues’ study is as follows. They presented their subjects – who took the roles of 
spectators – with scenarios of two people, A and B, who are both endowed with 20 money 
units and make contributions to a public good. B always free rides, that is, keeps all of his 20 
money units for himself. The different scenarios vary the extent to which A makes 
contributions to the public good. Depending on the scenario, A contributes 0, 5, 10, 15 or 20 
to the public good. People were asked, as a detached observer, how they morally judge B’s 
behavior for each of A’s possible contribution. The moral judgment scale ranged from -50 
(extremely bad) to +50 (extremely good).  
Figure 1A illustrates the result by showing the average moral evaluation of B’s free 
riding (contribution of 0 to the public good) for each of A’s possible contribution. The 
average moral evaluation is always below 0, that is, people think that B’s free riding is 
morally blameworthy. Interestingly, the same act of free riding is considered morally worse 
on average the more A actually contributes.  
  15 
 
Figure 1A: Moral judgment of free riding 
 
Data source: Cubitt et al. (2011b); own illustration. 
 
Figure 1B: Moral emotions – anger and guilt 
 
Data source: Cubitt et al. (2011a); own illustration. 
 
‐50
‐45
‐40
‐35
‐30
‐25
‐20
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
0 5 10 15 20
M
o
r
a
l
 
j
u
d
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
B
'
s
 
f
r
e
e
 
r
i
d
i
n
g
 
(
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
‐
5
0
 
a
n
d
 
+
5
0
)
A contributes ...
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
[‐20, ‐11] [‐10, ‐1] [0] [1, 10] [11,20]
E
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
(
1
=
"
n
o
t
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
"
;
 
7
=
"
v
e
r
y
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
"
)
Deviation of target group member's contributiion from i's contribution
Anger
Guilt16 
 
Figure 1A shows the average moral evaluation, which hides some interesting 
heterogeneity. About 50 percent of people actually have a flat “moral judgment function” that 
is, their moral evaluation of B’s free riding does not depend on how much A contributes. A 
third of the people think B’s free riding becomes morally worse the more A contributes.  
If free riding is considered morally blameworthy, does it also trigger negative emotions? 
Evidence using non-involved spectators who evaluate free riding behavior described in 
various scenarios, suggest so (Fehr and Gächter 2002). And if cooperation is morally 
commendable, does free riding trigger feelings of guilt? Anger and guilt are expected to be 
particularly relevant in a context of social cooperation because they can be seen as 
prototypical morally-linked emotions (e.g., Haidt 2003). 
Cubitt et al. (2011a) elicited emotions after players made their contributions in a one-shot 
public good to see to what extent free riding triggers anger by the cooperating individual and 
guilt by the free rider. Figure 1B shows that the average levels of anger and guilt seem to be 
mirror images of one another with the exception that a high level of free riding (where the 
target individual contributes between 11 and 20 tokens less than the focus individual) triggers 
the same anger as a lower level of free riding (the target individual contributes between 1 and 
10 tokens less than the focus individual).  
The moral or social emotions anger and guilt are interesting because they trigger two 
potential enforcement mechanisms – external and internal punishment. Angry individuals 
might be willing to punish free riders and therefore provide the free riders with an extrinsic 
self-regarding incentive to avoid punishment by contributing (discussed in more detail in 
Section 6). Guilt is a negative emotion that can serve as “internal punishment” and therefore 
provide an intrinsic reason to contribute to the public good to avoid feeling guilty. 
Dufwenberg et al. (2011) presented evidence that such "guilt aversion" can explain 
contributions to public goods.  
Further evidence for the importance of normative considerations comes from third-party 
punishment games (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004), where a potential punisher is not an affected 
party, but an independent third party (this feature thus resembles law enforcement in reality). 
In their experiment, two players, A and B, play a Prisoner's Dilemma game with two options: 
Cooperate (C) or Defect (D). In terms of material payoffs, the best outcome for a player is 
DC, that is to defect when the other player cooperates; the second-best outcome is CC 
(mutual cooperation); the third-best result is DD (mutual defection) and the worst outcome is 17 
 
CD (cooperating while the other player defects). This incentive structure gives both players 
an incentive to defect and therefore to forego the gains from mutual cooperation. Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004) add to this framework a third party who, at own cost, can punish both 
players A and B after having seen their decisions. Since the third party is not affected by A 
and B's decisions, third-party punishment is a reflection of normative considerations. The 
results show that third parties are much more likely to punish a defector if the other player 
cooperated (in 46 percent of cases) than if both defected (21 percent of cases); mutual 
cooperation is almost never punished.  
The results on third-party punishment are consistent with the findings on moral 
judgments (Figure 1A): free riding is considered particularly blameworthy if the other party 
cooperated. The third-party experiments uncovered that people have a willingness to pay for 
their normative convictions. Neuro-scientific evidence (Buckholtz and Marois 2012) as well 
as cross-cultural findings (Henrich et al. 2006) suggest that third-party punishment is a 
phenomenon that is deeply ingrained in the human condition.  
In summary, people think free riding is morally blameworthy and it also triggers the 
contributors’ anger and even third-party punishment. People who contribute less than others 
feel guilty. Thus, to the extent that people have feelings of warm glow, are bound by moral 
norms, want to avoid making other group members angry even if (third-party) punishment is 
not possible, and would feel guilty if contributing less than others, pro-social cooperation is 
expected. 
 
4.  THE DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL ORDER II:  
THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHER PEOPLE 
I introduced the one-shot public good game in Section 2 as one tool to study the existence of 
strong positive reciprocity.  The evidence suggests that people are willing to contribute to 
public goods even in one-shot settings. To investigate (the stability of) social order, however, 
requires repeated public good games. Notice that the repeated public good game is a stark 
setting to study social order: while one-shot settings allow observing people’s principle 
willingness to cooperate for the sake of the collective benefit, a repeated setup allows 
answering the question whether this willingness can help producing a stable social order.  18 
 
Are people able to provide a public good which has a collective benefit to all, if the 
collective benefit and the "shadow of the future" are the sole incentives? The fact that many 
people are guilt-averse, think free riding is immoral, and are also motivated by efficiency-
seeking should help in pursuing collective welfare. However, the sobering answer of many 
repeatedly played public good experiments is that cooperation almost invariably breaks down 
in repeated interactions. This result has been shown in numerous experiments around the 
world (Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008; Chaudhuri 2011) and is illustrated in Figure 3. 
In all subject pools people contribute substantial amounts initially but over time contributions 
dwindle to low levels almost everywhere.  
 
Figure 2: The breakdown of cooperation is ubiquitous: Evidence from fifteen countries 
 
Source: Herrmann et al. (2008) (Figure 3). Figure 2 shows the average contribution (out of 
the endowment of 20 money units) the subjects contributed in each round. The numbers in 
parentheses are average contributions over all rounds. 
 
One may argue that the experiments reported in Figure 2 are too short to properly reflect 
conditions relevant for social order. Unfortunately, existing experimental evidence suggests 
that the time horizon does not matter much. For example, in Gächter, Renner, and Sefton 19 
 
(2008) participants played for ten or fifty periods (and participants new this). Cooperation 
was low under both time horizons (less than 40 percent on average) but not different between 
time horizons. Rand et al. (2009) and Grujić et al. (2012) report very similar results (Grujić et 
al. even for 100 periods, and like in Rand et al. 2009 with participants being unaware of the 
exact number of rounds). Thus, the conclusion is inevitable and seems to vindicate Hobbes: 
in and of itself, that is, without external enforcement, social order is fragile and the time 
horizon as such is of no avail.  
Recall from Section 2 that one-shot public good experiments have found a positive 
correlation between beliefs about the contributions of other group members and own 
contributions, which is consistent with strong positive reciprocity. However, this positive 
correlation is not a particularly compelling measure of strong positive reciprocity. To see 
why, suppose, for whatever reason, Alice is very pessimistic about the contributions of others 
and thinks they will not contribute much or even nothing at all. Suppose further Alice would 
be willing to contribute provided others also contribute – Alice is a "conditional cooperator". 
Alice behaves as a free rider due to her pessimism not because her basic attitude to 
cooperation is free riding. Now compare Alice to Bill and assume that Bill is a free rider who 
will never contribute even if others contribute a lot. Thus, there is a problem: Alice and Bill 
both free ride, so their behavior is observationally equivalent, but their motivation is 
different. Bill is motivated to be a free rider, whereas Alice is a conditional cooperator who 
happens to be pessimistic.  Thus, separating behavior from motivation is important (see 
Lewinsohn-Zamir 1998 for a related argument in a law and public policy context). 
Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) introduce a design that allows separating behavior 
from motivation. In their experiment, participants are asked in an incentive-compatible way 
to make conditional contributions for all possible average contributions of the other group 
members (a so-called "strategy method"). Given the details of the incentive structure, people 
motivated by free riding will contribute nothing for all levels of possible average 
contributions of other group members. Conditional cooperators, by contrast, will increase 
their contribution in the average contribution of others. Thus, in this design, rather than just 
observing one contribution and one belief, we can observe a complete contribution schedule 
for all possible average contributions of others. Free riders and conditional cooperators are 
therefore clearly distinguishable, even if they both contribute nothing if others contribute 
nothing. Fischbacher et al. (2001) find that about 50 percent of their participants are 20 
 
conditional cooperators, 30 percent are free riders, and the rest follow some other patterns.  
The average person clearly is a conditional cooperator.  
The Fischbacher et al. (2001) experiment has been replicated many times in many 
countries and including representative subject pools (Thöni, Tyran, and Wengström 2012). 
Figure 3 illustrates the average conditional contribution from subjects in ten different 
countries around the world by showing the average contribution that subjects make as a 
function of all possible average contribution levels of other group members (expressed in 
percentages of the maximal possible contribution which differs across studies). 
 
Figure 3: The average person is a conditional cooperator: Evidence from ten countries 
 
Data source: Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit (2006) (New Zealand); Kocher et al. (2008) 
(Austria, Japan, USA); Herrmann and Thöni (2009) (Russia); Fischbacher et al. (2012) (UK, 
Switzerland); Thöni et al. (2012) (Denmark); Martinsson, Pham-Khanh, and Villegas-Palacio 
(2013) (Vietnam, Colombia). Own illustration.  
 
A couple of important insights can be taken away from Figure 3. First, although there is 
some variation, patterns are very similar across subject pools: low contributions by other 
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group members are met with low own contributions, and own contributions increase in those 
of group members. This is true in all ten subject pools illustrated here. Second, while 
contributions increase in the contributions of others, own contributions tend to remain below 
the diagonal, which implies that even conditional cooperators on average want to free ride to 
some extent on the contributions of other group members. Figure 3 depicts average 
conditional cooperation and it therefore hides heterogeneity. However, conditional 
cooperators are the majority and free riders a minority in all subject pools studied. The 
assumption that homo economicus describes average behavior is thus not supported by the 
experimental findings. 
Before I move on to discuss how the observation of Figure 3 can explain the fragility of 
social order, it is worth discussing three more observations about conditional cooperation: 
several psychological mechanisms predict conditional cooperation which makes it a highly 
likely pattern; conditional cooperation is externally valid; and conditional cooperation 
predicts contributions in experimental public good games.  
Several psychological mechanisms support conditional cooperation. Conditional 
cooperation is a likely pattern of behavior because various psychological mechanisms predict 
it.  I already mentioned two proximate mechanisms of strong reciprocity in Section 2 – 
inequality aversion and a desire to match like with like (reciprocity). Numerous experiments 
suggest the existence of inequality aversion and reciprocity and I have already sketched the 
argument how these motivations can explain conditional cooperation. Conditional 
cooperation is also supported by cooperative social value orientations where people take into 
account the welfare of others (Balliet, Parks, and Joireman 2009; Van Lange et al. 2014). A 
further channel to support conditional cooperation is guilt aversion, introduced in Section 3. 
If Alice thinks others expect her to contribute she might feel guilty if she wouldn’t and to 
avoid feeling guilty she actually makes a contribution to the public good; if she expects 
others not to contribute, she will also not feel guilty by not contributing herself.  
Moreover, conformism, a deep-rooted human tendency to copy other people’s behavior, 
also supports conditional cooperation. A desire to conform will lead a conformist to 
contribute if he or she thinks that is what other people will do; of course conformists will also 
free ride if that is what the majority does. This argument has found some experimental 
support (Carpenter 2004).  22 
 
Conditional cooperation has external validity. Conditional cooperation is not only 
observed under laboratory conditions but also in naturally occurring environments. For 
example, field experiments demonstrate donations to public goods consistent with conditional 
cooperation (e.g., Frey and Meier 2004; Shang and Croson 2009). Rustagi, Engel, and 
Kosfeld (2010) ran experiments with forest management groups in Ethiopia. They employ a 
measure similar to that used in the experiments summarized in Figure 3 and show that groups 
with a high share of conditional cooperators are more successful in forest management (an 
important public good in Ethiopia) than groups with a higher share of free riders. A final 
example is tax morale, which displays the behavioral logic of conditional cooperation that is, 
people are more likely to be honest in their tax declaration if they think most other people are 
as well (Frey and Torgler 2007; Traxler 2010).  
Conditional cooperation predicts contributions. Conditional cooperation is not only a 
phenomenon with high external validity; it is also internally valid in the sense that the elicited 
cooperation preferences predict actual play in new public goods games: people classified as 
conditional cooperators also behave as conditional cooperators in a new public good game 
and free riders tend to contribute nothing as predicted for them (Fischbacher, Gächter, and 
Quercia 2012). Moreover, when attitudes to cooperation are elicited multiple times, most 
people fall into the same type categorization each time, that is, conditional cooperation and 
free riding are intra-personally stable attitudes (Volk, Thöni, and Ruigrok 2012). This 
observation supports evidence that people’s other- or self-regarding behavior is consistent 
across games (Yamagishi et al. 2013).  
These observations are important for explaining why social order in and of itself, that is, 
without further incentives, is inherently fragile. As Figure 3 shows, the average person is a 
conditional cooperator, but detailed analyses show that some people are free rider types who 
never contribute. Moreover, on average, even conditional cooperators are selfishly biased. 
Most conditional cooperators will make a positive initial contribution to the public good and 
then take the average contribution of the other group members as the new benchmark. The 
fact that most conditional contributors are also selfishly biased will induce them to contribute 
less than the average next time and therefore cooperation will almost inevitably unravel and 
finally most people will contribute little or nothing to the public good. This prediction is 
consistent with the evidence (see Figure 2; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010 for a rigorous 
analysis; and Chaudhuri 2011 for a survey of this literature).  23 
 
This result of the unraveling of cooperation due to selfishly-biased conditional 
cooperation teaches us two important lessons. First, due to the process of conditionally 
cooperative reactions on others' contribution, many people will eventually behave like a free 
rider (contribute little to the public good) despite the fact that they are not motivated by 
selfishness. Second, cooperation is inherently fragile, and needs some support through other 
mechanisms to be sustainable.  
One assumption I have been making so far is that people are sorted at random into 
groups, and all experiments I discussed did in fact implement random group assignment. 
However, in reality, people can sometimes choose the social group they want to be in. Thus, 
the question is, does sorting help? The answer is a qualified yes. If people manage to sort into 
groups with strongly reciprocal conditional cooperators then such groups are indeed able to 
maintain high levels of cooperation and can prevent its breakdown (Gächter and Thöni 2005). 
This observation is consistent with conditional cooperation: if others cooperate conditional 
cooperators will cooperate too. But successful sorting requires that the cooperative types are 
indeed sorted together and are able to prevent free riders from entering (Ehrhart and Keser 
1999) and can credibly signal their type (for a discussion of signaling from a law point of 
view see Posner 2000). These are quite stringent conditions that may or may not be satisfied 
in real social groups.  
In summary, conditional cooperation is an important human motivation for many and, as 
numerous experiments have shown, a highly relevant determinant of social order. Thus, 
although conditional cooperation allows for the possibility of self-sustaining cooperation, it is 
unlikely that conditional cooperators manage to maintain high levels of cooperation. This is 
due to the existence of a substantial fraction of free riders and to the fact that even conditional 
cooperators typically display some selfish bias.  
 
5.  THE DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL ORDER III:  
PUNISHMENT AND OTHER INCENTIVES 
One important lesson from the research reported in the previous section why social order is 
fragile is that the only way a cooperator can avoid being “suckered” is to reduce his or her 
cooperation, thereby punishing everyone, even other cooperators. This raises the question 
whether targeted punishment (whereby group members can identify a free rider and punish 24 
 
him or her) actually can solve the free rider problem and prevent the breakdown of 
cooperation.  Mancur Olson, in a seminal analysis of the free rider problem in collective 
action, argued that “[O]nly a separate and “selective” incentive will stimulate a rational 
individual … to act in a group-oriented way”. Olson further noted that selective incentives 
“can be either negative or positive, in that they can either coerce by punishing those who fail 
to bear an allocated share of the costs of the group action, or they can be positive 
inducements offered to those who act in the group interest” (Olson 1965, p.51, emphasis in 
original). 
But who should apply these selective incentives?  One answer is that in modern societies 
the legal system does the punishment. However, the state with its law enforcement 
institutions is a novel phenomenon on an evolutionary time scale. For a large part of human 
history, social order needed to be sustained without central institutions. And even in modern 
times, self-governance is often necessary in many important social dilemmas (Ostrom 1990).  
One element of self-governance is informal sanctions as applied by other group members 
(Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992; this is sometimes also called peer punishment). But the 
problem is that punishing is itself a public good: If Alice punishes a free rider who then 
subsequently contributes his or her share, Bill will benefit also, even if he has not punished 
(and thereby behaves as a “second-order free rider”). If Bill is a homo economicus he will 
certainly not punish if punishment is costly and has no personal benefit for him (which is 
likely in many situations), but if Alice is a homo reciprocans she might punish even if 
punishment is costly. The evidence on strong negative reciprocity, reported in Section 2, as 
well as the seminal studies by Yamagishi (1986) and Ostrom et al. (1992) suggest many 
people are indeed willing to punish free riders and the second-order public good problem is 
actually less of an issue. As reasoned above, free riders who fear punishment might have a 
selfish incentive to cooperate, and higher rates of cooperation should also convince 
conditional cooperators to keep cooperating.  
Fehr and Gächter (2000) developed an experimental design to study punishment and 
cooperation in a sequence of ten one-shot (random group members - "Strangers") and fixed 
group ("Partners"; same group members) public good game – settings that correspond to 
different real-life interactions. The experiment proceeded as follows. Subjects first made their 
contributions to the public good, and then they entered a second stage, where they were 
informed about the individual contributions of all group members. Subjects could assign up 25 
 
to ten punishment points to each individual group member. Punishment was costly for the 
punishing subject and each punishment point received reduced the punished subject’s 
earnings from the first stage by ten percent.  
The results support the homo reciprocans hypothesis that people are willing to punish 
free riders and that punishment increases cooperation. In both the Stranger and Partner 
conditions contributions increased over time – contrary to the homo economicus prediction. 
There is a substantial difference in cooperation rates between Partners and Strangers. Partners 
contributed about 85 percent of their maximal contribution and Strangers about 58 percent. 
By comparison, without punishment cooperation rates under Partners and Strangers were 38 
and 19 percent, respectively. The fact that in the presence of punishment opportunities 
contributions even increased over time in a Strangers setting is particularly astonishing.  
What explains the difference in cooperation between the Partners and Strangers 
condition? One likely channel is that at the cooperation stage within stable groups an 
interaction effect exists between the availability of punishment and strategic reciprocity 
(reciprocity that is also in the self-interest of a free rider due to the repeated nature of the 
interaction). A repeated interaction and punishment are complementary instruments to 
stimulate contributions.  If only direct reciprocity is possible, cooperation collapses. If only 
punishment is possible but groups are formed randomly and hence direct reciprocity is not 
feasible, cooperation is stabilized at intermediate levels.  
A theoretically interesting benchmark case of the Stranger condition is a situation where 
the likelihood of future interaction is zero, that is, groups interact only once in the same 
constellation. This situation is interesting, because evolutionary theories of cooperation (see 
Rand and Nowak 2013 for a succinct summary), predict no cooperation in this case. 
Therefore, Fehr and Gächter (2002) set up a so-called “perfect stranger” design where in each 
of the six repetitions all groups are composed of completely new members, and participants 
are aware of this. The results show again that cooperation increases over time when 
punishment is available.  
The experiments of Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Fehr and Gächter (2002) also had a 
setting where subjects first played a condition with punishment and were then told that in a 
new condition the possibility of punishment would be removed. Again, the results show that 
punishment leads to high and stable cooperation rates. But when punishment is removed, 
cooperation collapses almost immediately and dwindles to low levels. This suggests that a 26 
 
cooperative benchmark is not enough to support cooperation if not supported by the 
possibility of punishment.  
While cooperation differs strongly between Partner, Stranger, and Perfect Stranger 
conditions, punishment patterns are qualitatively and even quantitatively similar across 
rounds: the more a group member deviates from the average contribution of his or her group 
members the higher is the punishment that he or she will receive. These observations are 
remarkable given that cooperation levels differ strongly between conditions. The fact that 
strong reciprocators punish even under Perfect Stranger conditions and that this punishment 
induces free riders to increase their contributions makes punishment altruistic: the punisher 
only bears the costs of punishment and because under Perfect Strangers the punisher will not 
meet the punished group member again the benefits of increased cooperation accrue solely to 
the future group members of the punished subject.  
The experiments I have discussed so far force participants by way of experimental design 
into a condition where punishment is or is not available. What do people choose if they have 
a choice between being subjected to a condition where punishment is available and one where 
punishment is ruled out? Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006) studied this question 
and got an interesting result. Initially, people opt for the no-punishment environment but soon 
they experience the problems of free riding. This experience changes their preferences and 
after a few more rounds the majority prefers an environment with punishment. 
The proximate mechanisms behind altruistic punishment give an indication why 
punishment is not a second-order public good in practice. Punishment seems to be an impulse 
triggered by negative emotions and not much by forward-looking considerations (e.g., Casari 
and Luini 2012).  
By now, there has been a lot of experimental and theoretical work on punishment and its 
effectiveness to stimulate cooperation. This literature is too voluminous to discuss here and I 
refer the interested reader to relevant surveys (Sigmund 2007; Gächter and Herrmann 2009; 
Balliet et al. 2011). I concentrate on five issues that are most relevant for my present purpose: 
the role of the severity of punishment and costs of punishment for the success of cooperation; 
punishment as a mere threat; imperfect observation and errors; institutionalized punishment; 
and incentives provided by rewards and reputation.  27 
 
Severity and costs of punishment. The monitoring frequency and the severity of inflicted 
punishment matter for the effectiveness of punishment to stabilize (or increase) cooperation 
(Egas and Riedl 2008; Nikiforakis and Normann 2008). The more severe punishment is for 
the punished subject per unit of received punishment the higher are contributions. Although 
punishment is to a large extent non-strategic it follows cost-benefit considerations in the 
sense that punishment is less likely used the more costly it is for the punisher (e.g., Anderson 
and Putterman 2006). The fact that the level of cooperation corresponds to the severity of 
punishment suggests that low contributors respond strategically to the expected harm of 
punishment. If severe punishment is expected, free riders are deterred and cooperate. That is, 
although not pro-socially motivated, expected strong negative reciprocity can induce a 
selfishly motivated person to behave like a cooperator. Experiments by Shinada and 
Yamagishi (2007) also confirm the argument that increased cooperation by free riders 
through punishment strengthen the resolve of conditional cooperators to cooperate.   
Punishment as a mere threat. One important characteristic feature of punishment is that 
it might not be used very often if people anticipate punishment and therefore try to avoid it 
through appropriate action. This is how law enforcement works in many instances. In the case 
of contributions to a public good, punishment is not necessary if people contribute at high 
levels and punishment might therefore simply act as a deterrent. This argument requires that 
punishment be a credible threat, that is, punishment indeed occurs if contributions are too 
low. If punishment is credible, then in equilibrium it will not happen very often. The 
existence of strong reciprocator suggests that some people are indeed willing to punish free 
riders, so punishment should be credible. After having received punishment free riders 
typically increase their contributions, so punishment has the desired behavioral effect. But 
can punishment also work as a mere threat?  
To study the question whether punishment can also work as a mere threat, Gächter et al. 
(2008) extended the experiment to 50 periods. This should give plenty of time to establish 
punishment as a credible threat, and later on as a mere threat with very little actual 
punishment necessary to sustain high and stable contributions.   
  28 
 
Figure 4: Punishment can stabilize social order through a threat of punishment alone. 
 
Data source: Gächter et al. (2008). Own illustration. Triangles indicate the punishment 
condition; circles indicate the no punishment condition; and the dashed line indicates 
punishment frequency (measured on the right-hand vertical axis). 
 
Figure 4 depicts cooperation with and without punishment. In the latter condition, 
cooperation is modest and slowly dwindling to low levels. In the condition with punishment 
cooperation approaches very high levels quickly. Consistent with the threat effect, 
punishment frequency is relatively high in the early phase of the experiment but approaches 
very low levels (less than 10 percent) in the second half of the experiment. Thus, punishment 
can exert its power as a mere threat effect, yet the threat has to be there. If punishment is 
impossible, cooperation breaks down.  
Imperfect observation and errors. All experiments I have discussed so far assume that all 
contributions are perfectly observable and no errors occur. This is quite unrealistic and an 
important line of research investigates the consequences of imperfect observability and errors 
on punishment, cooperation, and overall efficiency of interactions. One way to model errors 
is to allow only for binary decisions: contribute or not (e.g., Ambrus and Greiner 2012). An 
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error occurs if a contribution is actually registered as a non-contribution with a certain 
probability. If people apply the legal principle that punishment should only be used if the true 
act is known, little punishment of non-contributions should occur. However, a typical finding 
is that people punish too much and falsely hit a contributor too often with the consequence 
that punishment is less effective in stimulating cooperation than under perfect error-free 
observability of contributions (Bornstein and Weisel 2010; Grechenig, Nicklisch, and Thöni 
2010). See Grechenig et al. (2010) for a discussion of the relevance of these findings from a 
legal science point of view.  
Institutionalized punishment. The evidence I have discussed so far is all based on peer 
punishment. These experiments reveal two things: people get angry about free riders (see 
Section 4) and this anger induces some people to punish free riders; that is, punishment 
reflects punitive sentiments. Given that punishment is expected, self-regarding people now 
have an incentive to cooperate. Modern lawful societies channel punitive sentiments into 
laws and a formal, institutionalized sanctioning system, which provide incentives to 
cooperate.  
What matters from the point of view of a self-regarding individual is the expected cost of 
free riding. The presence of peer punishment might make cooperation worthwhile, but so can 
incentives provided by other mechanisms. For example, O'Gorman, Henrich, and Van Vugt 
(2009) and Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) studied centralized punishment by one group 
member and found it quite effective. Centralized punishment can even be effective if it is not 
deterrent (Engel 2013). Falkinger, Fehr, Gächter, and Winter-Ebmer (2000) showed that an 
exogenously given tax-subsidy mechanism induces people to cooperate in line with 
theoretical predictions about how the incentives should work. Another line of research, dating 
back to a seminal paper by Toshio Yamagishi (1986) showed that people are also willing to 
contribute to a “punishment fund” (think of funding law enforcement through people’s taxes) 
to punish lowest contributors. Comparing (the evolution of) peer punishment and pool 
punishment has triggered theoretical investigations (Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen, and Hauert 
2010) and is also an important topic of experimental research (e.g., Traulsen, Röhl, and 
Milinski 2012; Zhang et al. 2013). 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss briefly two mechanisms other than punishment 
that have also proved effective in supporting cooperation. The mechanisms I will consider are 
rewards; and indirect reciprocity and the role of a good reputation.  30 
 
Rewards. Because punishment is successful in increasing cooperation (under perfect 
observability), an intuitive question is whether rewards can also sustain cooperation. 
Punishment, whenever it is used, has the disadvantage that it is costly for the punisher as well 
as for the punished person (i.e., punishment is inefficient because resources are destroyed). 
Rewards do not have this disadvantage. They might be costly too for the rewarding person, 
but if the benefits of the reward at least cover the costs, rewards are not inefficient.  
Most experiments model rewards analogously to punishment: after group members have 
made their contributions, they are informed about each contribution made and can then 
allocate reward points to the target group member. One reward point costs 1 money unit and 
the rewarded group member then gets, depending on the experiment, one or more money 
units as an additional payment. The results suggest that this mechanism can also stimulate 
contributions, in particular if the rewarded individual receives more than what it costs to 
reward (Sefton, Shupp, and Walker 2007; Rand et al. 2009; Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher 
2010). For example, in experiments comparable to Gächter et al. (2008) summarized in 
Figure 4, Rand et al. (2009) showed that achieved cooperation levels were as high as those 
under punishment.  
It is important to notice that there is a fundamental asymmetry between punishments and 
rewards: rewards have to be used to be effective, whereas under punishment a credible threat 
can suffice (Figure 4). Thus, punishment can be very cheap whereas rewards will be costly. 
Moreover, in a context of law enforcement rewards are typically the exception and threats of 
punishment the norm.     
Indirect reciprocity and reputation. Humans keenly care about their reputation. Why? 
The mechanism of indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 1998) provides an important 
likely channel. People not only help those who helped them (direct reciprocity) but might 
also help those who helped others. Thus, if one has a reputation of helping others one might 
receive more help as well and it pays to be a cooperator. Experimental evidence supports this 
theoretical argument (e.g., Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck 2002). Relatedly, people's 
concerns to be held in good esteem can stimulate pro-social behavior (e.g., Ariely, Bracha, 
and Meier 2009). Evidence for the success of reputation-based incentives is not restricted to 
the lab. For example, a recent field experiment showed that a concern for good reputation can 
help in energy conservation, which is an important public good in the real world (Yoeli, 
Hoffman, Rand, and Nowak 2013).    31 
 
 
6.  RULE OF LAW AND SELF-GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL DILEMMA PROBLEMS  
The research I have presented so far has mostly been conducted in a few Western societies, 
such as the United States, Britain, and Switzerland. How representative are these societies 
when making claims or inferences about human nature? According to an influential study by 
Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) there is substantial heterogeneity in human behavior 
across the many societies on this planet that make the Western societies look as outliers. Does 
this also hold for the behavioral patterns reported in this chapter?  
The existence of strong positive and negative reciprocity has been shown in many 
societies around the world (Henrich et al. 2005; Henrich et al. 2006). Herrmann et al. (2008) 
conducted a series of public goods experiments without and with punishment in fifteen quite 
different large-scale societies around the world (such as the United States, Turkey, China, 
Saudi Arabia, and England; see Figure 5). They uncovered three important findings relevant 
for the present topic. First, without punishment cooperation breaks down everywhere (Figure 
3). Second, with punishment, it turns out that people punish free riders very similarly across 
the fifteen societies. In stark contrast, there is substantial cross-societal variation in antisocial 
punishment, that is, punishment of people who contributed to the public good by people who 
contributed less than the group member they punish. Third, there is a very large variation in 
cooperation levels achieved and, due to antisocial punishment, cooperation does not always 
raise contributions compared to the condition without punishment. Figure 5A illustrates the 
cooperation levels achieved and their relation to antisocial punishment. 
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Figure 5A: Cross-societal cooperation and antisocial punishment 
 
Data source: Herrmann et al. (2008). The illustration is taken from Figure 8 in Gächter and 
Thöni (2011). 
 
Figure 5B: The stronger is the Rule of Law the lower is antisocial punishment. 
 
Data source: Herrmann et al. (2008); own illustration. 
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The results by Herrmann et al. (2008) provide us with an important caveat on the power 
of punishment to stimulate pro-social cooperation. Punishment only increases cooperation if 
it is targeted towards free riders exclusively; antisocial punishment is a huge impediment to 
successful cooperation. Relatedly, punishment can only stimulate cooperation if it does not 
trigger counter-punishment (e.g., Nikiforakis 2008).   
The Herrmann et al. (2008) study reveals another relevant finding, namely that the 
severity of antisocial punishment in a society is linked to the Rule of Law in that society. The 
Rule of Law indicator is a governance indicator developed by the World Bank to measure 
how well private and government contracts can be enforced in courts, whether the legal 
system and police are perceived as being fair, how important the black market and organized 
crime are, etc. (see Herrmann et al. 2008 for details). Figure 5B illustrates how the Rule of 
Law is linked to antisocial punishment observed in a given society.  
The results are quite striking. The Western societies all have a high Rule of Law index 
value and there is also very little antisocial punishment observed in these societies. The 
variation in antisocial punishment increases substantially once the Rule of Law index falls 
below 1 (the theoretical range is between -2.5 and +2.5). 
The significance of this finding is twofold. First, the fact that experimentally measured 
behavior is correlated to societal measures suggests that the societal background has an 
influence on behavior. The studies by Henrich et al. (2005), Henrich et al. (2006) and 
Henrich, Ensminger, et al. (2010) suggest such an influence based on the organization of the 
small-scale societies where they conducted their research. The Herrmann et al. (2008) 
findings show that societal background also matters for developed, large-scale societies. 
Second, and more importantly for present purposes, the negative correlation of antisocial 
punishment and the quality of the Rule of Law in a society suggests that a high quality law 
enforcement system (which can be interpreted as a high degree of institutionalized 
cooperation) will also limit antisocial punishment and thereby an important inhibitor of 
voluntary cooperation. Good institutions make for good self-governance of people who 
manage to cooperate with one another and who limit punishment to those who fail to 
cooperate.    
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7.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter I have provided evidence from two decades of behavioral economics research 
that, rather than being selfish as is assumed in the homo economicus paradigm, many people 
are strong reciprocators, who punish wrongdoing and reward kind acts. However, a sizeable 
minority of people is best characterized as selfish. My main focus has been on determinants 
of social order which I have construed as a social dilemma where individual incentives are 
not aligned with collective benefits.  
I have argued that from the perspective of the behavioral science of cooperation, and in 
particular strong reciprocity, social order has three important determinants: the strength of 
internalized norms of pro-social behavior, the behavior of other people, and the threat of 
punishment or the presence of other incentives to curb selfishness. Looking at the many 
results in synthesis suggests the following big picture: many people are motivated by 
character virtues such as honesty and trustworthiness; they think that free riding is morally 
blameworthy; they feel guilty if it turns out that others contributed more to the public good 
than them; they are angry at the free riders; and they experience some warm glow by 
contributing to the public good. However, all research shows that people are also very 
strongly looking at the behavior of others to determine their behavior. Since a sizeable 
number of people are free riders and even many conditional cooperators have a selfish bias, 
cooperation in randomly assembled groups is inherently fragile. Cooperation can only be 
sustained under the strong requirement that only highly cooperatively inclined people are 
matched and able to exclude free rider types. Under more realistic conditions, stable pro-
social cooperation requires some incentives, most notably punishment, where often a credible 
threat suffices to keep free riding at bay.  
Notice that the three determinants of social order are also linked. If norms are strong and 
induce many people to cooperate then the psychology of conditional cooperation will induce 
many people to cooperate as well. However, because a sizeable minority of people is not 
motivated by normative considerations but only by own gain, norms appear a rather weak 
determinant of social order because conditional cooperators will only cooperate if others do 
as well. In other words, the psychology of conditional cooperation appears to be the stronger 
behavioral force than normative considerations and, as a consequence, cooperation will be 
fragile. This conclusion follows from three separate observations I recorded in this chapter: 
(i) character virtues and normative considerations including feelings of guilt if others behave 35 
 
more cooperatively matter for many people (Figure 1); (ii) conditional cooperation is an 
important motivation for the average person (Figure 3) and (iii) cooperation nevertheless 
almost inevitably breaks down if not backed up by incentives (Figure 2). Punishment (or 
other incentives) have the dual advantage that they induce the free rider types to cooperate 
and thereby convince the conditional cooperators to maintain their cooperation.  
I conclude this chapter with some remarks on future research. Of the three determinants 
of social order the first determinant (the role of norms, moral judgments and emotions such as 
guilt for cooperation) is the least well understood determinant of cooperation. More research 
is necessary to understand people's normative consideration and to what extent this influences 
their behavior. With regard to the second determinant (conditional cooperation) an important 
open question is gaining a complete picture of proximate mechanisms that determine 
conditional cooperation including gauging their relative importance. The third determinant 
(punishment and other incentives) is the best understood determinant. Open questions are 
finding explanations for antisocial punishment and how antisocial punishment is causally 
related to the Rule of Law (Figure 5). A further under-researched topic is the role of 
institutional punishment for successful cooperation, in particular in comparison with peer 
punishment and when considering the role of errors and imperfect observability. Finally, an 
important topic for future research is to understand how exactly the three determinants are 
linked and how the three determinants work in naturally occurring settings. 36 
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